Supranational institutions, academics and market analysts have increasingly questioned the reliability of bank risk-weighted assets (RWAs), a cornerstone of the system of minimum capital ratios designed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. In fact, significant differences can be found in the banks' average risk weights, both over time and across countries. Such differences can be explained by several factors, some of which may reflect the actual risk content of bank's assets, while others may conceal distortions due to "RWA tweaking" and supervisory segmentations. We analyze a sample of 50 large European banks between 2008 and 2012 and document several meaningful findings. First, risk weights are affected by the banks' size, business model and asset mix. Second, the adoption of internal ratings based (IRB) approaches is (as expected) a powerful driver of bank risk-weighted assets. Third, lower risk weights are positively linked to the banks' capital cushion. Fourth, IRB adoption is more widespread in countries where supervisory capture is potentially stronger, due to a banking industry that is both larger (compared to GDP) and concentrated. Fifth, regulatory risk weights are not disconnected from market-based measures of bank risk.
Introduction
Strengthening capital ratios has become a priority in the aftermath of the [2007] [2008] [2009] financial crisis. Recent regulatory reforms (i.e., Basel III), however, have primarily focused on improving the numerator of the capital ratios (by requiring banks to hold more high quality capital), while limited changes have been suggested to the denominator, i.e., to the risk-based weights used in the computation of the bank's risk-weighted assets (RWAs). 1 Nevertheless, the RWAs of large banks worldwide have shown remarkable discrepancies, weakening the credibility of risk-based capital measures.
Several studies have been published on RWA heterogeneity (see Section 2 for details).
Regulators have highlighted wide variations in the ratio of RWAs to total assets (i.e. the average risk weight, often referred to as "RWA density") across banks: cross-country differences also look significant, prompting questions about the consistency of risk measurement methodologies across jurisdictions. Further doubts on the reliability of RWAs have been raised by academic studies. In the same vein, market participants have questioned the comparability of capital ratios, arguing that banks may not be as capitalized as suggested by risk-based measures (The Economist, 2012) . Investors and rating agencies have increasingly focused on "adjusted" capital ratios, which reduce the heterogeneity across banks by imposing floors and caps to the risk weights used (de Longevialle, 2008) . Regulators have endorsed the use of "plain", un-weighted capital ratios as a backstop against the opportunistic use of risk-weighted measures. In fact, the Basel Committee has recently announced that it will review the measurement of RWAs and formulate policy responses to foster greater consistency across banks and jurisdictions (BCBS, 2013a and 2013b) . A similar mandate has been assigned to the European Banking Authority by article 78 of the 4 th Capital Requirements Directive.
Against this backdrop, our work aims to address several issues: first, to gain a better understanding of why there are material differences in RWA densities, and whether they are legitimate; 2 second, to investigate how the adoption of internal ratings (one of the key drivers behind a bank's average risk weight) is affected by bank characteristics and supervisory style; third, to assess the relationship (if any) between RWAs and some market-derived risk indicators, embedding the investors' views on individual banks. In doing so, we check the effect of national specificities on RWA discrepancies (Le Leslè and Avramova, 2012) .
We analyze a sample of large European banks between 2008 and 2012. Our results, presented in detail in Section 4, document several meaningful findings. First, risk weights are affected by the banks' size, business model and asset mix; additionally, lower risk weights are the result of internal ratings adoption (as expected) and are positively linked to the banks' capital cushion. Second, the extent to which a bank is allowed to use internal ratings depends both on its characteristics (e.g., its size) and by the amount of industry lobbying faced by its national supervisor. Third, regulatory risk weights are not disconnected from market-based measures of bank risk. Overall, national segmentations play a significant role in explaining the above mentioned relationships.
Our findings contribute to the debate on RWA (and capital ratios) and expand the empirical evidence on this topic. A better understanding of the drivers behind the perceived inequalities in bank risk weights may help restore the credibility of the RWAbased regulatory framework, reducing investors' skepticism and its many adverse consequences. This includes the shift towards over-simplified indicators based on unadjusted total assets, the demand for higher capital ratios to compensate for their low perceived reliability, the risk that financially sound institutions get rationed in their ability to raise equity and to stay in business.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates the institutional background and related literature. Section 3 describes our data sample. Section 4 presents the main empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
Background and related literature
Regulations require banks to hold a minimum amount of own funds ("regulatory capital") to offset losses that may originate from their risky investments. Capital requirements must therefore increase with the riskiness of a bank's assets; this is achieved by converting the face value of assets into a risk-weighted equivalent. The first international accord on bank capital (so-called "Basel I", issued in 1988) had devised a simple set of risk weights ranging from 0% for credit exposures towards OECD governments and public sector entities (where no regulatory capital was required) to 100% for loans to individuals and non-financial companies. While this scheme made it easier to implement the accord across different jurisdictions, it proved simplistic over time, as well as prone to regulatory arbitrage. E.g., a "flat" 100% risk weight for all non-financial companies meant that banks could focus on high-risk borrowers in order to maximize interest revenues in the short term, while increasing future defaults and credit losses.
The second accord on bank capital ("Basel II", in 2004) allowed for further diversification in the risk-weights: the latter could now be differentiated, within the same exposure type (e.g., companies, banks or governments), depending on the actual credit risk of individual borrowers. To estimate the risk weight of each obligor, banks could choose between credit agency ratings and their own internal assessments, 3 subject to validation by national supervisors.
Since 2004, a growing number of banks have opted for the internal-ratings based ("IRB") approach. Many of them have achieved substantial benefits in terms of lower capital consumption, compared to the standardized approach based on agency ratings. This has contributed to the distrust towards IRB models, and investors have started to look at "RWA tweaking" as a suspicious practice.
The 2007-2009 Great Financial Crisis has reinforced the belief that RWAs may have helped banks disguise a rising credit bubble by keeping their stated capital ratios artificially high. The third international accord on bank capital ("Basel III", agreed in late 2010) has thus imposed a cap on the banks' "plain" (un-weighted) leverage ratio, in an attempt to curb biases due to opportunistic/flawed internal ratings.
Empirical studies point to significant divergences in RWA density across banks and jurisdictions. A first strand of literature, largely based on descriptive analyses and mostly emanated from public bodies (including EBA, IMF and BCBS) and market analysts (Barclays Capital 2011; BNP Paribas 2011) has looked at factors explaining RWA differences 4 . Le Leslè and Avramova (2012) distinguish between bank-specific factors that reflect actual risk-taking (e.g., the business model or asset quality) and factors unrelated to bank risks (e.g., due to institutional, accounting, and regulatory variables).
BCBS (2013b) finds that the banks' modeling choices are an important driver of riskweights for market risk. Based on a top-down quantitative exercise on a large sample of European banks, EBA (2013) finds that about 50% of the divergence can be explained by simple factors (i.e., share of assets covered by the IRB approach, standardized weights, portfolio mix, defaulted credit exposures). It also finds that differences in the implementation of the IRB approach are due to managerial and supervisory practices. Ledo (2011) finds that, although some divergences are justified, there is still scope for a more level playing field, mainly through closer international coordination among supervisors in the validation of IRB models. Arroyo et al. (2012) also emphasize the role of the IRB validation process in explaining cross-country discrepancies. Furthermore, they highlight the limitation of the most used RWA density measure (the RWA/TA ratio), which may give rise to spurious differences among banks, and propose an alternative indicator 5 . Cannata et al. (2012) propose a methodology to disentangle the main factors underlying RWA differences. Using supervisory data for a sample of Italian lenders, they
show that a large portion of cross-bank variance is explained by the business mix of 4 See BCBS (2013a), Appendix 1, for a complete list of these studies. 5 This is in some respects similar to our RWAEAD indicator (see Section 3 below These measures focus on risk for equity holders, while RWAs measure the riskiness of a bank's assets as a whole, and therefore should affect both a bank's equity and its debt. In §5 we will consider risk measures related to a bank's assets (asset volatility) and to its overall debt/equity mix (weighted average cost of capital).
find that a higher cost of equity prompts lower risk weights. This suggests that banks may artificially inflate their capital ratios when equity is more expensive. Looking at a subsample of international banks using the advanced IRB approach, they also find that -as the share of assets covered by IRB models increases -RWA density drops and capital becomes more expensive.
Vallascas and Hagendorff (2013) use a sample of international banks in 2000-2010 to assess the risk sensitivity of capital requirements to bank risk under Basel I and II, testing whether RWAs increase with asset return volatility. They find that the risk sensitivity of RWA-based capital is low, and increased only marginally with the advent of Basel II.
Additionally, Basel II had an asymmetric impact on low-risk and high-risk banks. While the former have reduced their capital requirements through the IRB approach, the latter were not pushed to hold significantly more capital. As a result, riskier banks hold an insufficient amount of capital, while banks showing a large capital buffer (in excess of the minimum requirements) report lower risk weights for any given level of risk. reported risk declines upon IRB adoption, and that this effect is more significant for weakly capitalized banks. This supports the view that capital-constrained banks may use the IRB approach strategically to improve the capital ratios. Mariathasan and Merrouche also find that higher levels of supervisory scrutiny are typically associated to better risk reporting.
Data sources and sample description
We look at the 50 largest European banking groups (by total assets in 2012) 8 over a 5-year window (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) . We use both financial statements and additional information taken from Pillar 3 reports. The latter include the incidence of different risk types (market, credit, operational) and portfolios (corporate, retail, banks, public sector entities)
on each bank's capital requirements, as well as the approach used to measure credit risk (standardized or internal ratings-based).
The banks in our sample are located in 17 countries (see Table 1 ); 48 are listed 9 and 49 adopt IFRS. 10 We complement financial statement and Pillar 3 data with a number of risk measures based on capital market indicators: stock return volatility, asset volatility, 11 weighted average cost of capital for listed banks, and CDS (credit default swap) spreads for banks that are referenced by actively-traded contracts.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
Accounting data are from Bureau van Dijk's Bankscope, capital market indicators come from Bloomberg and Markit, while Pillar 3 Reports were downloaded from individual 8 Some institutions, for which Pillar 3 data were not directly available, were excluded. 9 The two unlisted banks are DZ Bank AG and Rabobank. 10 Credit Suisse Group AG adopts the US GAAP standards. 11 As in Vallascas and Hagendorff (2013) .
bank websites. It is worth noting that, while Pillar 3 reports are compulsory for most banks, their content is not standardized and they are not based on a common reporting template; hence, individual data items provided by different banks had to be validated and reconciled by hand against a common data scheme. In the former ("RWATA") risk-weighted assets are divided by total assets, as reported in banks' balance sheet:
This ratio has a very intuitive interpretation (as the bank's "average" risk weight); nevertheless it does not account for the fact that capital requirements (hence, riskweighted assets) 12 may also follow from risk exposures that are not captured by a bank's total assets (e.g., operational risk, as well as credit risk originating from off-balance sheet items).
This leads us to our second indicator ("RWAEAD"), which is based on Pillar 3 information:
RWA for Credit Risk EAD for Credit Portfolio RWATA  This ratio only focuses on capital requirements against credit risk; the denominator includes on-balance sheet exposures as well as an estimate (based on regulatory parameters) of credit exposures originated by off-balance sheet items. While its scope may be less general than for RWATA, its numerator and denominator look more consistent, since both refer to credit-related risks.
13
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
[Insert Figure 1]
13 RWAs against credit risk account for a large percentage of total RWAs (84% in our sample).
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Main results
Univariate analysis
In order to explore the relationship between RWA densities and bank characteristics, we first look at pairwise correlations on a univariate basis (see the last two columns of Table   2 ). We find that RWATA and RWAEAD are significantly correlated with most variables proxying for the banks' business models and operating environment, risk measurement approaches, market-perceived risk and capital levels.
Institutions with larger risk weights tend to be smaller (see Panel II), more focused on the traditional loans-and-deposits business, more exposed to retail and, to some extent, corporate portfolios (as opposed to financial institutions and the public sector). Risk weights increase as the real economy decelerates and tend to be lower in countries where the banking industry is larger (compared to GDP) and more concentrated.
Lower risk weights involve a more extensive usage of IRB models, especially advanced ones (Panel III). This was expected, since Basel II allows banks to use IRB on a voluntary basis (subject to supervisory approval); accordingly, only institutions that foresee significant capital savings are willing to invest extensively on internal models.
Risk weights correlate significantly (albeit not perfectly -see Panel IV) with most market-based risk measures, namely CDS spreads, Asset Volatility, WACC and Z-scores.
This marks a change relative to previous empirical tests (Vallascas and Hagendorff, 2013) , where no significant link had emerged. However, our sample encompasses a long period of financial distress (including the subprime meltdown and the Eurozone crisis)
that triggered considerable variance across banks and over time. This may make it easier for different risk indicators to convey similar signals. Additionally, banks having higher risk weights show a more significant level of ex-post credit risk, as measured by the impaired loans to total loans ratio.
14 Finally, risk-weights correlate inversely with risk-weighted capital. Banks reducing RWA density to relatively low levels are apparently required (by supervisors, investors or both)
to hold a larger cushion of excess capital. A possible explanation is that institutions can obtain supervisory/market approval for more "aggressive" risk weights only by holding a larger capital buffer above the regulatory minimum. This may mean that banks (and, again, supervisors and investors) are bound by some sort of un-weighted capital ratio, where the product between the risk-weighted Tier 1 ratio and the average risk weight cannot deviate too much from some "optimal" target level. 
Multivariate analysis

Factors affecting the RWA density
We first look at the drivers of RWA density by estimating the following OLS regression: -Business model includes three variables: DEPOSITS (the deposits to total assets ratio), LOANS (the loans to total assets ratio), CORPORATE (the ratio of corporate loans to total customer loans) and RETAIL (the ratio of retail loans to total customer loans);
18
-IRB_adoption stands for variables indicating the share of a bank's loan portfolio that is covered by internal ratings. Our main variable here is "HIGH_RETCORP_IRB", a dummy equal to one when the share of corporate and retail loans under the IRB approach exceeds the sample median. We focus on retail and corporate portfolios because they are the ones where internal models usually prove more beneficial in terms of capital relief (Le Leslè and Avramova, 2012) . In fact, most loans to institutions benefit from high external ratings, while exposures to governments receive a zero risk weight according to European rules. 16 As noted above, Table A .1 in Appendix A provides a full list of the variables used throughout this paper, each one with a short description. 17 To obtain comparable values, we convert banks' total assets into euros. 18 Further covariates were tested (including return on assets and the share of non-interest income over total gross operating income) without improving the significance of the model.
-Real economy includes GDP_GROWTH (the real annual GDP growth rate for the country where a bank has its main headquarters). The effect of GDP_GROWTH on risk weights is ambiguous. On one hand, as the economic environment deteriorates banks may decrease lending and switch to safer investments (e.g., government bonds), leading to a drop in the average RWA density. On the other hand, for banks under the IRB approach, an economic slowdown may trigger higher default rates, leading to an increase in the borrowers' estimated probabilities of default (PDs), which are used to compute regulatory capital. To disentangle those two effects, we interact GDP_GROWTH with HIGH_RETCORP_IRB; the interacted variable is aimed to capture the effect of GDP changes for heavy IRB users.
-Regulatory capital is measured through TIER1_RWA, the ratio of the Tier 1 to risk-weighted assets; we focus on Tier 1 capital only since lower quality capital The results are shown in Table 3 for RWATA_OR (Columns I-III) and RWAEAD_OR (Columns IV-VI); standard error estimates are made heteroskedasticity-consistent by clustering errors at bank level. 20 In Columns (II) and (V) we test country dummies;
Columns (III) and (VI) also include year dummies. To check for multicollinearity issues, we also report the maximum variance inflation factor ("VIF") and the condition number of the correlation matrix.
21
[Insert Clustering by country would leave our results virtually unchanged. 21 A common rule of thumb requires that variance inflation factors be below 5, and condition numbers below 10, for heteroskedasticity concerns to be negligible (Belsley, 1984; Friendly and Kwan, 2009) . 22 As an alternative to HIGH_RETCORP_IRB, we have tested IRB_LOANS (the share of credit exposures for which the IRB approach has been adopted), coming to very similar results. We have chosen to stick to HIGH_RETCORP_IRB for the sake of consistency, as the latter is also interacted with GDP_GROWTH in our model. downturn leads to lower risk weights (due to a "safe haven" effect), but banks using IRB also experience an increase in RWA density due to the effect of higher default rates on their estimated PDs.
Moving to RWAEAD_OR (Column IV), most results are confirmed, although DEPOSITS and LOANS lose statistical significance. This suggests that banks involved in the traditional business of raising deposits and issuing loans are less penalized once one focuses on credit-related risk weights (losing sight of the capital relief caused by, e.g., the internal models for market and operational risk).
Our results stay virtually unchanged when country variables enter the model (see Columns II and V). Although only some country effects are significantly different from zero, a joint likelihood ratio test for all dummies shows that they cannot be considered redundant with a 95% (or even 99%) confidence level. The fact that national segmentations affect risk weights raises doubts on the consistency of RWA-validation methodologies across different jurisdictions. Finally, year dummies are not significant at 95% (although they are at 90%, see Columns III and VI).
Factors affecting IRB adoption
IRB adoption (captured through HIGH_RETCORP_IRB) plays a significant role in the results shown in Table 3 . We therefore look at its drivers over time and across banks by estimating the following OLS regression (again, with standard errors clustered at bank level): BANKGDP (the ratio of bank total assets to GDP) indicates the banking system's importance for the national economy; BANKCONC is a measure of bank concentration (the market share of the country's top 3 banks in terms of total assets).
IRB sharei,t = f(SIZEi,t, Business modeli,t, Regulatory capitali,t, Countries,
25
[Insert Table 4 about here] 23 To prevent IRB_LOANS_OR from reaching minus infinity, a 5% floor is imposed on IRB_LOANS.
Since the latter never reaches one, no cap is required. 24 We are not testing the impact of GDP growth on IRB adoption because we do not have strong expectations there. Although moving to internal ratings may involve stronger benefits when the economy is booming (as PDs are lower, and so is capital consumption), banks shifting to the IRB approach cannot easily switch back. Accordingly, there is limited room for "tactical" moves dictated by economic upturns. Unsurprisingly, GDP_GROWTH would be statistically insignificant if one were to add it to the variables tested in Table 4 . 25 The values for BANKGDP and BANKCONC are taken from the EBA Aggregate statistical data (available at http://www.eba.europa.eu/supervisory-convergence/supervisory-disclosure/aggregatestatistical-data) and the World Bank Financial Development and Structure Dataset, revised on November 2013 (available at http://go.worldbank.org/X23UD9QUX0), respectively. As a few values are not available, they are replaced with the closest year. Table 4 shows that internal models are used more extensively by large banks with less deposits and a larger capital cushion. Country dummies in Model (2) prove jointly significant, showing that national segmentations exist, above and beyond the characteristics of individual banks. 26 In Model (3) we test whether IRB adoption responds to some structural characteristics of the national banking systems, leading to stronger supervisory capture. We find that the share of bank loans covered by internal ratings is significantly higher in countries where the banking sector is larger (compared to GDP) and more concentrated, so that lenders have more lobbying power vis à vis the national supervisors. When BANKGDP and BANKCONC enter the model, the joint significance of country dummies drops below 90%; when the latter are removed (Model 4), the model's explanatory power remains virtually unchanged.
Model (1) in
The link between risk weights and market-derived risk measures
We now go back to some of the market-derived risk measures shown in Table 2 (Panel   IV) , to see whether their relationship with regulatory risk weights can be further explored on a multivariate basis.
We consider two actual market-based indicators (WACC and CDSSPREAD), as well as two proxies estimated through a mix of accounting and market data (ASSETVOL and ZSCORE). 26 Year dummies are omitted from Table 4 , as they are never statistically significant at 90% or more.
WACC is the weighted rate of return that a bank ideally has to pay on its debt/equity mix.
While the cost of debt is based on CDS spreads, 27 the cost of equity is generated through a standard market model.
28
CDSSPREAD is the yearly mean of daily quotes for 5-year credit default swap contracts denominated in euros (with a "modified-modified" restructuring clause) for senior unsecured debt, as reported in the Markit database.
29
ASSETVOL indicates asset volatility, estimated through a standard KMV approach (see e.g. Sobehart, 1999, Sobehart et al., 2000) and captures the risk of a change in the value of a bank's assets.
ZSCORE is the Z-score, computed following Boyd and Graham (1988) , Boyd and Runkle (1993) , and . This is defined as the ratio between a bank's return on assets (ROA) plus its capital-to-assets ratio (the numerator) and the standard deviation of the asset returns (the denominator). 30 ZSCORE measures the adequacy of the capital buffer protecting bank creditors, taking into account also the past volatility of net profits; accordingly, a high Z-Score denotes low risk for investors and vice versa.
WACC and Asset Volatility capture the overall risk of a bank's assets (and therefore are conceptually closer to regulatory risk weights); CDS and Z-Score instead follow a partially different perspective as they focus on credit risk for debt holders.
For each of these four market-derived risk measures, we estimate the following model:
MDRMi,t = f (Risk weightsi,t, SIZEi,t, Business modeli,t, Controlsi,t, Countries, 
where:
-MDRM is the market-derived risk measure (in turn: WACC, CDSSPREAD, ASSETVOL and ZSCORE);
-Risk weights includes RWATA and RWAEAD. Since the two variables are strongly correlated, we orthogonalize the latter by regressing it on RWATA and taking the residuals (henceforth "RWAEAD_O");
-SIZE, Business model, Countries and Years retain the same meaning as in Equation (1) above;
-Controls includes the bank's un-weighted capital ratio ("EQUITY_RATIO"), the ratio of impaired loans to total loans ("IMPAIRED LOANS") and the return on assets ("ROA"). We also control for national GDP growth, to see whether economic cycle considerations are priced in by market participants.
To allow enough time for bank characteristics to affect marked-based risk measures, the latter are recorded with a one-year delay. This means that, e.g., when all covariates are measured in 2010, the dependent variable refers to 2011 and so on.
Our main results are shown in Table 5 . For each market-derived risk measure we present a full model (where all independent variables are tested) and a reduced one, where the least significant variables are gradually removed, and only those with a p-value below 10% are retained.
Most market-based risk measures are affected by regulatory risk weights, the only exception being Z-Scores. 31 . Higher risk weights lead to an increase in WACC and CDS spreads, and are accompanied by a rise in Asset Volatility.
Banks more focused on "core" commercial banking (retail and corporate loans) seem to be perceived as less risky. This may sound counterintuitive at first sight, but could follow from the market's distrust with wholesale-oriented business models, which have proved heavily exposed to government debt and interbank loans. Although market-based indicators improve for banks more inclined to traditional lending activities, they also get significantly worse as impaired loans increase. Stronger GDP growth and higher ROAs reduce risk according to CDS spreads and WACC. Country and time dummies are highly significant. As concerns the latter, asset volatility improves in 2010-2011, as stock volatility goes back to normal after the shock induced by the Lehman collapse, and higher capital ratios constrain the effect of leverage on asset returns. WACC and CDS spreads, however, remain adversely affected until 2012, due to the Eurozone sovereign crisis.
Country dummies show that, even controlling for some structural and environmental variables, regulatory risk-weights translate into market based-risk measures in a way that is affected by national specificities. Italian banks, e.g., are less penalized by market-31 As a matter of fact, Z-scores are not a true market variable being based on an estimate involving accounting data and a number of working assumptions).
derived risk measures than their comparatively high regulatory risk-weights would suggest. The opposite holds, to some extent, for Greek lenders.
Final remarks
A lively debate, involving institutions, academics and market analysts, has questioned the reliability of risk-weighted assets (and the related capital ratios). Reported risk weights have experienced a steady decline in 2008-2012, a period when bank risks have hardly been decreasing; furthermore, material differences exist across banks and jurisdictions.
As a result, one may wonder whether regulatory risk weights are truthful indicators of bank riskiness.
In principle, differences over time and across institutions can be explained by several factors, some of which may reflect the actual risk content of bank's assets, while others may conceal distortions due to "RWA tweaking" and supervisory segmentations.
We have analyzed a sample of large European banks between 2008 and 2012 and our results point to several meaningful findings. First, risk weights are affected by the banks' size, business model and asset mix. Second, IRB adoption is (as expected) another powerful driver of risk-weighted assets. Third, lower risk weights are positively linked to the banks' capital cushion. Fourth, IRB adoption is more widespread in countries where supervisory capture is potentially stronger, due to a banking industry that is both larger (compared to GDP) and more concentrated. Fifth, regulatory risk weights are not entirely disconnected from market-based measures of bank risk. Overall, country effects play a clear role in explaining the banks' risk weights; national segmentations are also found in the relationship between risk-weights and market-derived risk indicators. All this seems to hint at some form of national segmentation that deserves further analysis. the ratio of the Tier 1 to Risk-weighted Assets GDP_GROWTH the percentage change -over previous year -in the country's real GDP We also include year and country dummies for countries with at least 3 banks. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Reported are the coefficients of OLS regressions with standard errors corrected for clustering at the bank level. The dependent variable (IRB_LOANS_OR) is the odds ratio of the ratio between Loans subject to internal ratings and Total Loans (IRB_LOANS). Explanatory variables are defined as follows: SIZE the Log of Total Assets DEPOSITS the ratio of Total Deposits to Total Assets LOANS the ratio of Total Loans to Total Assets CORPORATE the ratio of the Total Corporate Loans to Total Loans RETAIL the ratio of the Total Retail Loans to Total Loans TIER1_RWA the ratio of the Tier 1 to Risk-weighted Assets BANKCONC the market share (by total assets) of the country's top 3 banks BANKONGD the ratio of the country's bank total assets to GDP We also include year and, for countries with at least 3 banks, country variables. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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